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The Long Arm of the Law 2019
Moderated by Ann Okerson, Senior Advisor, Center for
Research Libraries (CRL) Presented by Michelle M. Wu,
Associate Dean for Library Services and Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center; and William
M. Hannay, Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP. Video of this
session can be seen at https://youtu.be/7iyHmOJJlUE.

Part One: Controlled Digital Lending,
ReDigi, Georgia, and Accessibility /
Michelle M. Wu
Controlled Digital Lending (CDL)
Controlled digital lending (CDL) can be accomplished
in a variety of ways, but any implementation has
three elements: the library must own a legitimate
copy of the work, the library owns an own‐to‐loan
ratio, and any digital copy circulated in place of
the print copy is controlled through digital rights
management (DRM). Essentially, CDL is a version
of format shifting, where libraries aim to meet the
same lending goals of the original acquisition, simply
in a different format.
Each of the elements becomes easily understood in
the context of format shifting. The library must own
a legitimate copy of a work, which typically means
purchased but could also mean a gift from someone
who has purchased the item themselves. Since the
library is seeking only to use works that it has legitimately acquired, it will never use more copies than it
owns. A library owning 5 copies of a title, then, could
choose to circulate all 5 online and none in print, 3
online and 2 in print, or any other combination so
long as the total number of copies never exceeds the
5 that it owns. Last, any digital item circulated must
be controlled by DRM—a technology already widely
experienced by any user who has checked out an
e‐book through their public library—so that the item
cannot be copied wholesale or redistributed.
This conference session will focus primarily on
providing a brief look at the legal underpinnings of
CDL, but for a deeper dive or insight to the nonlegal
aspects of CDL, conference‐goers can visit https://
controlleddigitallending.org/readings.
The legal justification for CDL falls squarely within a
fair use analysis. The text of the fair use statute, 17
U.S.C. §107, reads:
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Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106
and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
Fair use is a broad exception, intended to be flexible
enough to accommodate changes in customs and
technologies. While it does require that these four
factors be considered, these factors are not exclusive
and courts are free to examine any other relevant
information in their analysis. But since the four
factors feature heavily in case analyses, we will talk
about each in relation to CDL here.
The character and purpose of CDL use is identical
to the use of the original, so lending online does
not appear to be a transformative use. Though it is
not transformative, many nontransformational uses
have been determined to be fair use, so we take the
inquiry further. Since the purpose of CDL duplicates
the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine—to be able
to use items that a person or entity has acquired—
and the library has actually acquired a copy of the
work, it would appear that the purpose of the use
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is in harmony with copyright laws writ large. The
character of use is noncommercial, and combined
with the CDL purpose of lending, appears to fall well
toward a favorable fair use assessment.
As in all cases, factors two and three cannot be
viewed in isolation. It is true that the works lent by
libraries comprise both fiction and nonfiction, and
that the full text of the works have been copied in
any CDL initiative. However, it would also be true that
there have been cases—such as Perfect 10, Google
Books and HathiTrust—where the entirety of a work
has been copied and fair use was still found. Given
the general consensus that these factors cannot be
viewed in isolation and are themselves not determinative, these factors are neutral and will be reviewed
only in the context of the first and fourth factors.
Fair use, then, seems to rest primarily on the fourth
factor, as it does in most cases. Since this is not a
transformative use, the question is: does the lending
of a digitized copy of a work affect “the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” (emphasis
added)? The key part of this test is the definition of
the market. It is the market of the copyrighted work
that is relevant, not any other market. In the case of
CDL, this becomes complicated as two (or more) markets may be involved: the market for the copyrighted
work and the market of a given technology.
First, it is important to note that not all market harm
is protected by copyright laws. Copyright is not
intended to protect against scathing reviews that
damage sales, for example, or the activities of used
booksellers, which could also impact sales of works.
The market harm that the fourth factor considers is
whether or not illegitimate copies of the work are
replacing copies in the marketplace.
Second, copyright is medium neutral, a concept that
has been used both offensively and defensively in
litigation. An author of a work cannot claim a new
copyright if all he does is transfer an existing work
to a new medium, and a defendant cannot fight a
charge of infringement by claiming that converting
a work to a new format removes the work from the
protection of the original copyright. In other words,
copyright protects the work, not a format.
Market impact, then, is measured on the overall
market for the work, not by any change in any of the
individual markets for the different formats of the
work. In CDL, libraries would still buy titles in print

representing the actual number of copies needed by
their communities. At its heart, the question that has
to be asked and answered is this: if a library has one
lendable copy before digitization and one lendable
copy afterward, can market harm (if any) be attributable at all to infringing the work? Or is it entirely
attributable to technology, which copyright does
not protect? The library’s digitized copy replaces the
library’s purchased copy and not an unsold copy on
the market. For that reason, any market damage
should not be the type protected by copyright laws.

ReDigi
ReDigi is a used digital music resale service that
claimed to move a music file from the devices of the
original buyer to its own servers and then eventually
to the new purchaser. It believed that its functionality was protected by both fair use and first sale. Both
the district and appeals courts disagreed and determined that ReDigi’s process made reproductions, not
transfers, making the actions ineligible to claim the
protections of first sale, and simultaneously determined that ReDigi had no fair use claim.
After the most recent ruling, CDL proponents were
asked if they felt that the decision influenced CDL’s
fair use analysis. For two reasons, ReDigi is so easily
distinguishable from CDL that the court’s reasoning
simply would not apply to any CDL instance. First,
and most important, the court and both parties to
the suit agreed that ReDigi actually had no control
over the copy. The original purchaser and the new
purchaser could indeed listen to the same music
simultaneously after resale. Second, ReDigi was a
commercial operation and had explicitly stated that
it had entered into the resale market to compete
directly with the copyright owners’ market.
CDL is undertaken by not‐for‐profit libraries for
noncommercial services, and since libraries acquire
the works, apply DRM to any digitized copies,
determine which patrons check out the materials,
and set the length of time users are authorized to
use the materials checked out, they have control in
a way that ReDigi (a nonowner of a copy) simply did
not. Further, as noted above, the library’s digitized
copy is not intended to compete with any market; it
is intended to replace the print copy already on the
library’s shelf.
Interestingly enough, though, if the ReDigi case were
to be cited in CDL, it would be for its definition of
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transformative, which expanded transformativeness
to include uses that improve efficiency. Since CDL
uses digital copies that are more easily checked out
by users, especially those who are disabled or who
live in remote areas where libraries have shortened
hours, this new definition of transformativeness
should apply to CDL.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org
This case, currently before the Supreme Court, is the
most recent in a line of cases designed to understand
what rights individuals have to access the laws that
govern them. Georgia’s only official version of its
statutes are an annotated code, where the statutes
themselves are free from copyright but the annotations continue to be protected. The circuit court
determined that even the annotations should be free
from copyright protection.

Accessibility
I was asked to highlight one or two cases or issues
that are likely to see significant developments over
the next year. Both of the issues that I will flag are
about accessibility, though admittedly, one of them is
about accessibility writ broadly as opposed to accessibility as related to those with print disabilities.
Litigation surrounding accessibility of websites
for those with print disabilities has been growing
over the last few years, and in the coming year, we
expect at least one appeals court to consider how
responsible a library should be for the accessibility
of external information (e.g., licensed databases).
One district court has already determined that a
library must make sure that such information is fully
accessible or discontinue use entirely, which means
that their entire community would lose access to
the materials. Providing ad hoc accessibility work‐
arounds was not considered acceptable to the court.
The second issue of interest is the continued narrowing of access by publishers in providing materials
to libraries. As covered by ALA’s report to Congress
on digital markets, recent publisher action includes
Amazon’s refusal to license digital books to libraries
at all and Macmillan’s decision to limit how many
copies of an e‐book a library can acquire and when
acquisition can take place. Congress and libraries
are likely to continue examining this type of anti‐
competitive behavior, and I list it under “accessibility” because such limitations have the most impact
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on poorer populations. If the only way to read a book
is to buy it, then those without resources will never
have access to them.
Both of these issues are fairly new so there is not
sufficient information to discuss either in depth,
but expect to hear more on both by next year’s
conference.

Part 2: “Same Old, Same Old” / Bill Hannay,
Schiff Hardin LLP
Topic One: The Right to Be Forgotten . . .
Revisited . . . Again
Did the ECJ “forget” what it ruled?
On 9/24/19, the European Court of Justice ruled
that EU privacy law cannot be enforced beyond the
European Union.
Thus, the EU’s “right to be forgotten” is restricted to
the EU.
On 10/3/19, the ECJ ruled that Facebook can be
forced to delete content worldwide. The court held
that individual countries can order Facebook to take
down posts globally.
Why the different results? The 9/24 decision re:
Google.
The ruling to limit the geographical reach of the
right to be forgotten is a victory for Google over the
French privacy agency.
The decision is intended to prevent international disputes over the reach of the EU’s laws. The court said
Europe could not impose the right to be forgotten on
countries that do not recognize the law.
In a related case, the ECJ held that individual privacy rights must be weighed against the public’s
right to know about some categories of personal
information.

The ECJ’s 10/3/19 Ruling
On 10/3/19, the court held that individual countries
can order Facebook to take down photos, videos,
and posts globally. Why different from the ECJ’s 9/24
ruling? Because courts have broader power if the content is found to be defamatory or otherwise illegal.

The case involved social network comments calling an
Austrian politician a “traitor,” “corrupt,” and a “fascist.”
Pause . . . switch screen to the U.S.

California Adopts New Privacy Law
California has adopted a new Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) that is the toughest in the U.S. It includes a
“right to delete” similar to the EU right.
The right to delete in the CCPA (which goes into
effect on 1/1/20) grants consumers the right to
request deletion of their personal information.
But unlike the EU right, the CCPA right is limited to
a request that a business delete personal information about the consumer “which the business has
collected from the consumer.”

Privacy Fight in the U.S. Is Growing
Spurred by the enactment of the CCPA, U.S. tech
companies have begun to push for federal privacy
legislation rather than be subjected to 50 different
state privacy regimes.
Naturally they would prefer that the federal law be
much softer than the California (or EU) model. But
consumer organizations in other U.S. states are beginning to push for CCPA‐style laws. So the fight goes on.

What’s the Significance to Libraries?
A global take‐down order (that is valid under the
ECJ’s 10/3 decision) would theoretically reach a
library’s databases. Though, as a practical matter, the
database company would be the first line of action,
so the library may not have to do anything.
A library or other institution in California may have
responsibilities under the CCPA in case of a request to
delete “personal information” about a patron or student.

Topic Two: Pornography Is Not Education
v. EBSCO
You may recall that last year, a group of Colorado
parents sued EBSCO and the Colorado Library Consortium, claiming that the companies “knowingly provide
sexually explicit and obscene materials to school children.” (The parents were represented by the Thomas
More Society, a conservative nonprofit law firm.)

In February 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
their lawsuit. Why? Apparently because they were
concerned about what would happen if they lost
the case. In Colorado, a prevailing party can recover
its attorney’s fees if the trial judge determines that
the other party’s claims or defenses were frivolous,
groundless, or prosecuted in bad faith.
The Thomas More Society vows to continue its
campaign.

Topic Three: ACS and Elsevier v.
ResearchGate
Update: Judge won’t make ACS and Elsevier bring in
authors.
Remember how, last year, the American Chemical
Society and the publisher Elsevier sued ResearchGate GmbH in Maryland federal court for copyright
violations, alleging “massive infringement of peer‐
reviewed, published journal articles”? What’s the
status?
ResearchGate defended, claiming that when the
plaintiffs’ publications appear on the defendant’s
website, it is often because a co‐author (who has not
personally signed an agreement with the publishers)
is the one who uploaded the material.
In early 2019, ResearchGate filed a motion to require
the publishers to serve these co‐authors with a
notice under § 501(b) of the Copyright Act because
they “have an interest” in the copyrights asserted
by the plaintiffs and their rights are “likely to be
affected” by the outcome.
In June 2019, the court denied ResearchGate’s
Motion for Notice. The court pointed out that
ResearchGate did not offer even one specific
example of a co‐author who uploaded an article
believing that he or she had the right to do so. The
court found that the defendant had not met its
burden to prove that evidence in the record casts
doubt upon the validity of the publishers’ copyrights.
Accordingly, the case will proceed.

Topic Four: If It Quacks Like a Duck . . .
Great American Duck Races v. Kangaroo
When does one duck‐shaped pool float infringe
copyright on another? (By the way, what do you call
a duck that steals? A robber ducky!)
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Great American Duck Races Inc. is a company that
runs fundraising “races” using small rubber ducks
(like the one on Sesame Street).

Then it decided to make a giant one as a pool float.
Great Am’s success led Kangaroo Mfg. to enter the
market with its own giant rubber duck.
This led to a copyright lawsuit.
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